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Abstract 
Reid, K.B., The relationship between two algorithms for decisions via sophisticated majority 
voting with an agenda, Discrete Applied Mathematics 31 (1991) 23-28. 
Two algorithms have been described in the literature for determining the sophisticated voting 
decision under amendment procedure. Each depends only on a majority tournament, which 
represents the majority preferences of the alternatives by the electorate, and a voting order of the 
alternatives, which represents an agenda. One algorithm is due to Shepsle and Weingast; another 
was suggested earlier by Miller and treated recently by Reid. Here it is shown that the validity 
of each of these algorithms can be used to establish the validity of the other. 
1. Sincere and sophisticated voting decisions 
It is known (see the references to McGarvey, to Stearns, and to Erdos and Moser 
in the monograph by Moon [3]) that every tournament of order n arises as a majority 
preference digraph on a set A of n alternatives. That is, given a tournament T with 
vertex set A, there exists a finite number of linear orders on the set A so that x 
dominates y in T if and only if x is ranked over y in a majority of the linear orders. 
In a voting context, each linear ordering represents the preferences of a voter, and 
T represents the pairwise majority preferences of the electorate. 
Under amendment procedure of voting, some order, say (al, a2, . . . , a,), of the n 
alternatives in A is given. The voting order is also referred to as the agenda. If T 
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is a tournament with vertex set A, the sincere order (cl, c2, . . . , c,) is defined induc- 
tively by ci = al and, for 2 pi 5 n, 
ci = 
L 
ai , if ai dominates c;_t in T, 
c;-1, if ci_t dominates a, in T. 
The alternative c,, is called the sincere decision with respect to T and voting order 
(at, a2, . . . , a,>. 
This procedure can be thought of as n - 1 successive votes. In the first vote al 
(which is ct) and a2 are paired for a majority vote, the defeated alternative being 
eliminated and the winning alternative denoted c,. At the ith vote, 2<isn - 1, the 
alternative ci surviving the (i- 1)th vote is paired with a;,, for a majority vote, the 
defeated alternative being eliminated and the winning alternative denoted c,,,. The 
alternative surviving the (n - l)th vote, c,, is the sincere decision. This description 
is given in Miller [l]. It can be seen that these n - 1 votes correspond to II - 1 arcs 
in T which form a rooted tree; such trees have been characterized by Reid [5]. 
This sincere procedure can also be described via a balanced, binary rooted tree 
on 2”-’ vertices, called the division tree. Vertices in the division tree are labelled by 
subsequences of the agenda (a,, a2, . . . , a,) as follows: the root at level 0 is labelled 
(al,a2, . . . . a,); for 0 rjl n - 2, a vertex at level j which is labelled by a subsequence 
of length n-j, say (d,, d2, . . . , d,,_J), dominates exactly two vertices at level j+ 1, 
one labelled (d,, d,, . . . , d,, _j) and one labelled (d2, d,, . . . , d,, _i). The labels of the 
vertices in the division tree depend solely on the agenda. See Reid [5] for a census 
of the vertices in the division tree. Now, given a majority tournament with vertex 
set A, the (sincere) amendment procedure given above yields a path in the division 
tree from the root to an end vertex labelled with the sincere decision. In terms of 
the sincere order (c,, c2, . . . , c,,), this path encounters in turn the vertices with labels 
given by 
ha2, . . . . a,) = (cl,a2,...,an),(c2,a3,a4,...,a,), 
&-3,ab...,aJ ,... ,(cj,aJ+,,...,a,) ,... ,(c,-l,an),c,. 
The division tree is also used to describe what is known as sophisticated voting 
under amendment procedure relative to a fixed majority tournament and a fixed 
agenda (al, a2, . , . , a,). Sophisticated voting introduces a strategic approach to the 
amendment procedure. In brief, decisions are anticipated at higher levels of the divi- 
sion tree in order to anticipate decisions at lower levels, until an anticipated decision 
at the root is determined. A formal description follows. Recall that each vertex of 
the division tree at level II - 2 is labelled with an ordered pair of alternatives; the an- 
ticipated decision at each vertex of level n - 2 is defined to be the majority choice 
between those two alternatives. Recursively, for OQ<n - 2, the anticipated deci- 
sion at each vertex u of level j is defined to be the majority choice between the two 
anticipated decisions at the two vertices at level j + 1 which are dominated by u in 
the division tree. The sophisticated voting decision under amendment procedure is 
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the anticipated decision of the root vertex at level 0. This description is (essentially) 
given in Miller [I]. 
In this paper we will often employ the convention that T, W, etc. will denote both 
a tournament and its vertex set, if no confusion results. 
2. Shepsle’s and Weingast’s algorithm and Miller’s algorithm 
Let T be a fixed majority tournament with vertex set A and let (a,, al, . . . , a,) be 
a fixed agenda. Shepsle and Weingast [6] introduced a simple algorithm for specify- 
ing a special alternative. Define the sophisticated agenda (z,, z2, . . . , z,) as follows: 
z,=a,, and for 1 sj< n, 
zj = 
i 
ajf if aj dominates Zj+l, . . ..z.,, 
q+1, otherwise. 
Note that the zi need not be distinct. Shepsle and Weingast [6] proved that z, is the 
sophisticated decision (see also Moulin [4] and Reid [5] for alternative proofs). 
Another algorithm was alluded to by Miller [l, pp. 789-7911 and [2, pp. 81-821 
and described precisely by Reid [5]. Here we use W* to denote the initial strong 
component of a tournament IV, and for a vertex x in W, Z(x) denotes the in-set of 
x, i.e., all vertices of W that dominate x. With T and (al, a2: . . . , a,) as above, define 
sets of vertices (alternatives) FI$, Orion, as follows: W, is T and br, denotes the 
last vertex of T* in the voting order (a,,a,, . . . . a,), and for iz 0, having defined 
w,, ..*, II$, if q=0, then IV,+, = 0 and bj is not defined, while if W, #0, then b; 
denotes the last vertex of q* in the voting order and I#$+, =I(b;) fl K$*. Reid [5] 
proved that for some k<n, Wz= {bk} and bk is the sophisticated decision. Note 
that the b, are distinct. Here we will call the sequence (bk, b,_,, . . . . 6,) the sub- 
sophisticated sequence (for reasons to be made clear in the theorem below). We 
recall the following lemma from Reid [S]. 
Lemma. (i) For O~i~rn, if H$#0, then 
w+,sU: and K:;T~S%*. 
(ii) For 0~ is m, if w # 0, then b, precedes b;_, in the voting order, and b; 
dominates each of bo, . . . , b;-, in T. 
(iii) W, = 0. 
(iv) Zf k=max{iI &#0}, then Wk*={bk}. 
Our aim here is to describe the relationship between these two algorithms without 
utilizing the facts that each terminates in the sophisticated decision. As a conse- 
quence we obtain proofs that termination of one of the above algorithms in the 
sophisticated decision implies the termination of the other algorithm in the sophis- 
ticated decision. 
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3. The relationship between the two algorithms 
Suppose that T is a majority tournament with vertex set A and that (al, u2, . . . , a,) 
is a fixed voting order. Let (z,, z2,. . . , z,) denote the sophisticated sequence obtained 
by the Shepsle and Weingast algorithm, and let (bk, b,_ 1, . . . , b,) denote the sub- 
sophisticated sequence obtained by the Miller algorithm. The distinct alternatives 
b/g&,,..., bo correspond to alternatives ajk, ajl ,, . . . , Ojo. By part (ii) of the Lemma, 
j,< j,_,<.,. < j,. These indices are used to describe our main result. 
Theorem. For Osisk, bi=zj,. Hence, bk=ZJc=Zj,_,=...=z,. 
Proof. We induct on i to show that 6, = Zj,, 0 i is k. Before launching the induc- 
tion we show that for any i, 0s ic k, if j,< n and b, is defined, then 
bj dominates each of ajo + 1, uj0+ 2, . . . , a,. (1) 
For, bj E M$*, by definition of bi, so b; E W,* = T” by part (i) of the Lemma. By 
definition of jO, each of aj,+ ,, ajo+*, . . . , a, is in T-T*. So, (1) follows by defini- 
tion of T*. 
First we treat the case i= 0. If j, = n (i.e., 6, = a,), since z, = a, by definition of 
z,, we have b,,=zj,,. If j,<n, since {Zj,,+tT . .. . z,} c {a,,+t, . . . . cln}, we see by (1) that 
aj(, = b, dominates each of Zjo + 1, . . . , z,, . That is, by definition of Zj~~, Zj, =ajo. Conse- 
quently, bo = Zj,,. 
Suppose that O< is k and that the result holds for index values less than i. By 
definition of ji, 6, = aJ,. By part (ii) of the Lemma, 
bi dominates each of aj,~l, aj, z, . . . , aj,l,. (2) 
Consider the following i + 1 (i, if j, = n) consecutive subsequences of the voting 
order: 
&J = (Qjc,,+ 1, ... 7 a,) (ignore Se if je=n) 
s, = (q,+l~-..~~,,,) 
s2 = (aj2+1, **.yaj,) 
S, = (Qj,+l, ...,gj, ,). 
We prove, by induction on p, Ospii, that 
6, dominates any zh where ah is in S,. (3) 
For p=O, this follows from (1) above. Suppose that O<pci and that the result 
holds for index values less than p. As p - 1 <i, bP_, =Zj,, , (by the induction hy- 
pothesis on i). And by (2), since O<p - 15 i - 1, bj dominates aj,,~, = bP_, and 
bD - 1 = ‘J,, I by the induction hypothesis on i. That is, b, dominates bj,~ ,, where aj,,_, 
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is the last element in the subsequence SP; in other words, (3) is true for h =jP_t. 
Now, inductively (“backwards”) assume that bj dominates any zh where ah occurs 
inthelastpartofS,,i.e.,thatj,+l<I~j,_, andthatb;dominateszl,zl+r,...,zjp_,. 
We aim to show that 
bi dominates zI _ 1. (4) 
This certainly follows if zI = z/_ 1, so assume that zI # .z_ I. By the definition of zI_ t, 
z/-1 =a,_, and z/-l dominates zl,zlil, . . . , z,. In particular, since p - 1 < i, the induc- 
tion hypothesis on i yields bP_, = zjpml, . . . , b,=zj,,b,,=z,,, and since Irj,_,s...s 
j,s j,<,, we see that 
z/_, dominates bP_ ,, . . . , bl, bo. 
We claim that, without loss of generality, we may assume that 
(3 
zI_, is in each of W,*, W,*, . . . , WP*_,. (6) 
If not, let r, Orrrp-1, be the least index so that z,_te W;*. If r=O (i.e., 
z,_, E T- W: = T- T*), then as bj E Wi* (by definition of b;) and y:* c W,* = T* (by 
part (i) of the Lemma), biET* and bi dominates z/_t; i.e., (4) follows. If r>O, 
from above zI_ , dominates b,_ 1 (as 0 I r - 1 sp - 2) and zI_ 1 E W,? 1 (by choice of 
r), so zI_, l (Z(b,_ 1) fl W,‘,) = W,. Also, 6; e w* c W,* (by part (i) of the Lemma), 
so that bj E W,*. But z/_, E W,- W,*. Consequently b; dominates z/_, and (4) fol- 
lows. So, we may assume that z/-r is in each of W$, WI*, . . . , WP*_l. Now to com- 
plete the proof of (4), note that z/_, E (Z(b,_ J fl WP*_ J = WP by (5) and (6). And 
zI_, $ WP* since jP< I- 1 and bP =ajP was defined as the last vertex of r/VP* in the 
voting order. As before, bi E q* c WP* (by definition of b, and part (i) of the Lem- 
ma, since p< i). That is, bj E WP*, but z/_, E W, - WP*; so bi dominates zI_ 1 and (4) 
follows. Consequently, by induction (on I) bj dominates any zh where ah is in SP. 
That is, this completes the induction step to establish (3). So (3) follows. 
But (3) means that aj, = bi dominates each of zj, +,,Zj, +2, . . . ,z,,. But, by the 
definition of Z,, this means that Zj, = aj, . Hence, b; = z, . By induction bj = zj, for all 
i, Olilk. 
TO see that bk=zjjk=zj~~I=... =zI it suffices to prove that bk =zl. Suppose that 
Zj, = bk f ~1. Let 4 be the largest index 1 I q < j, such that zq # z, + 1 = .*- = zj,. By def- 
inition of zq, since z,#z,+t, z, dominates each of z~+~,z~+~, . . ..z.. In particular, 
since (by the first part of this theorem) (bk, bk_ ,, . . . , b,} c (zg+ 1, z*+~, . . . , zn}, 
zq dommates each of bk, bk_,, . . . , bo. (7) 
We show by induction on r that 
zqe Wr*, Osrsk. (8) 
Since z, dominates b. (by (7)) and b. E W$ = T* (by definition of b,), z, E W,* = T*. 
Assume that for O<rr k, zq is in each of W,*, W,*, . . . . W,?,. Now z, dominates b, 
(by (7)), so zqe (Z(b,)fl W,?,) = W,. Since Z~E Wr, z, dominates 6, (by (7)), and 
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b,.~ W,* (by definition of b,), Z~E W,*. So, by induction, (8) follows. In particular, 
zg E Wz. However, Wj$ = { bk) by part (iv) of the Lemma, so Z~ = bk. But, bk = Zj, = 
Zj,-I=“‘=Zq+l, so zq =z~+~, a contradiction to the choice of q. Thus bk =z, and 
the proof is complete. III 
Corollary 1 (Shepsle and Weingast [6, Theorem I]). Alternative z, is the sophis- 
ticated decision. 
Proof. Reid [5, Theorem lo] proved that bk is the sophisticated decision. By the 
Theorem bk =z,, so the result follows. 0 
Corollary 2 (Reid [5, Theorem IO]). Alternative bk is the sophisticated ecision. 
Proof. Shepsle and Weingast [6, Theorem l] (see also Moulin [4, Theorem 31 and 
Reid [5, Theorem 71) proved that z1 is the sophisticated decision. By the Theorem 
bk = zl, so the result follows. 0 
Remark. It is not the case that {b,, b,, . . . , bk), the set of distinct alternatives pro- 
duced by Miller’s algorithm, is equal to {zI,z2, . . . , zn}, the set of (distinct) alter- 
natives produced by Shepsle’s and Weingast’s algorithm. For, if T is the transitive 
tournament in which, for all i and j in { 1,2, . . . , n}, ai dominates aj if and only if 
i<j and if (a,,a2, . . . . a,) is the voting order, then k = 0 and b, = aI, but zi = al for 
all 1. 15Irn. 
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